\u3cem\u3eYoshida International, Inc. v. United States\u3c/em\u3e:  Was the 1971 Import Surcharge Legally Imposed? by Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 73 Issue 5 
1975 
Yoshida International, Inc. v. United States: Was the 1971 Import 
Surcharge Legally Imposed? 
Michigan Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the International Trade Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michigan Law Review, Yoshida International, Inc. v. United States: Was the 1971 Import Surcharge Legally 
Imposed?, 73 MICH. L. REV. 952 (1975). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol73/iss5/5 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
952 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 73:952 
Yoshida International, Inc. v. United States: Was the 1971 
Import Surcharge Legally Imposed? 
On August 15, 1971, President Nixon announced the imposition 
of a ten per cent ad valorem surcharge on all dutiable imports.1 Ac-
I. Pres. Proc. No. 4074, 85 Stat. 926 (1971). The Proclamation stated in relevant 
part: 
WHEREAS, there has been a prolonged decline in the international monetary 
reserves of the United States, and our trade and international competitive position 
is seriously threatened and, as a result, our continued ability to assure our security 
could be impaired; 
WHEREAS, the balance of payments position of the United States requires the 
imposition of a surcharge on dutiable imports; 
WHEREAS, pursuant to the authority vested in him by the Constitution and 
the statutes, including, but not limited to, the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended 
(hereinafter referred to as "the Tariff Act"), and the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 
(hereinafter referred to as "the TEA'?, the President entered into, and proclaimed 
tariff rates under, trade agreements with foreign countries; 
WHEREAS, under the Tariff Act, the TEA, and other provisions of law, the 
President may, at any time, modify or terminate, in whole or m part, any proclama• 
tion made under his authority; 
NOW, THEREFORE, I, RICHARD NIXON, President of the United States of 
America, acting under the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the 
statutes, including, but not limited to, the Tariff Act, and the TEA, respectively, 
do proclaim as follows: 
A. I hereby declare a national emergency during whicll I call upon the public 
and private sector to make the efforts necessary to strengthen the international 
economic position of the United States. 
B. (1) I hereby terminate in part for sucll period as may be necessary and 
modify prior Presidential Proclamations whicll carry out trade agreements insofar 
as sucll proclamations are inconsistent with, or proclaim duties different from, 
those made effective pursuant to the terms of this Proclamation. 
(2) Such proclamations are suspended only insofar as is required to assess a 
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cording to the President, the surcharge was necessary because an 
overvaluation of United States currency had created a situation in 
which United States imports were increasing faster than exports,2 
contributing to a balance of payments deficit.8 
To correct the overvaluation, the President could have unilater-
ally devalued the dollar,4 thus effecting a realignment of exchange 
rates. However, there was some concern that such an action by the 
United States would lead to similar devaluations by other countries, 5 
thereby negating any benefits the United States would derive from 
its devaluation. Therefore, the President chose to impose the sur-
charge as a temporary measure to slow the rising tide of imports and 
to encourage other countries to negotiate a realignment of exchange 
rates.6 When a realignment agreement was reached in December 
1971,7 the President terminated the surcharge,8 reestablishing the 
rates of duty that were in effect on August 15, 1971. 
surcharge in the form of a supplemental duty amounting to 10 per cent ad valorem. 
Such supplemental duty shall be imposed on all dutiable articles imported into the 
customs territory of the United States from outside thereof, which are entered, or 
withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption after 12:01 a.m., August 16, 1971, 
provided, however, that if the imposition of an additional duty of 10 per cent 
ad valorem would cause the total duty or charge payable to exceed the total duty 
or charge payable at the rate prescribed in column 2 of the Tariff Schedules of 
the United States, then the column 2 rate shall apply. 
Pres. Proc. No. 4074 was terminated in December 1971. See text at notes '1·8 infra. 
The United States Tariff Schedule lists two tariff rates, known as the "column one" 
and "column two" rates, for many items. 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1970). The column two rates 
are statutory rates. Most of these rates were enacted in 1930 as part of the Smoot-Hawley 
Tariff Act, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590. The column one rates are rates that either have been 
proclaimed by the executive, e.g., Pres. Proc. No. 3822, 82 Stat. 1455 (1968), or have been 
declared proclaimed rates by Congress. E.g., Act of July 9, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-41, 
83 Stat. 44. 
Pres. Proc. No. 4074 provided that the column two rate was the maximum tariff rate 
that could be imposed on an imported item. Thus, the Proclamation either imposed the 
statutory rate or established an intermediate rate between the rate in effect on August 
15, 1971, and the statutory rate, as illustrated in the Table: 
Column I Rate Column 2 Rate Rate After Surcharge 
Com 15% 25% 25% 
Grain 20% 25% 25% 
Soybeans 10% 25% 20% 
2. HOUSE CoMM. ON BANKING AND Ct!RRENCY, 92J> CoNG., 2D SEss., BACKGROUND 
MATERIAL ON LEGISLATION MODIFYING THE PAR VALUE OF THE DOLLAR 23 (Comm. Print 
1972) [hereinafter BACKGROUND MATERIAL]. 
3. The projected trade account in August 1971 showed an annual deficit of $2 billion 
for that year, and a deficit of $3 billion to $4 billion for 1972. Id. For a general discus• 
sion of balance of payments, see R. LIPSEY&: P. STEINER, ECONOMICS 680-88 (2d ed. 1969); 
P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 621-45 (7th ed. 1967). For a discussion of the relationship 
between overvaluation of currency and balance of payments deficits, see P. Eu.sWORTH, 
THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 332-33 (4th ed. 1969). 
4. See P. SAMUELSON, supra note 3, at 643. 
5. BACKGROUND MATERIAL, supra note 2, at 29. 
6. N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1971, at 1, coL 6 (late city ed.). 
7. See BACKGROUND MATERIAL, supra note 2, at 29. 
8. Pres. Proc. No. 4098, 86 Stat. 1591 (1972), 
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The Constitution gives to Congress, not to the executive, the 
power to set tariff rates and regulate foreign trade.0 Thus, unless 
Congress delegated this power to the executive,10 President Nixon's 
action in imposing the surcharge was ultra vires. 
In Yoshida _lnterrzational, Inc. v. United States,U an importer 
affected by the surcharge alleged that President Nixon had not been 
given the authority to impose it. The President claimed that the 
Tariff Act of 1930 as amended,12 the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,13 
~d section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act14 all provided 
a legal basis for his action.15 The United States Customs Court held 
that none of the acts cited by the President granted him the authority 
to impose the surcharge and hence ordered the government to pay a 
rebate to the importers.16 This Note examines the court's decision, 
and concludes that, although the President's action cannot be justi-
fied under the Trading with the Enemy Act, it can be upheld under 
the Tariff Act of 1930 and the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. 
9. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8. Historically, Congress has exercised these powers. See 
K. MA'CKENZm, TARIFF-MAKING AND TRADE PouCY IN THE U.S. AND CANADA 1-25 (1968); 
F. TAUSSIG, THE TARIFF HlsrORY OF THE UNITED STATES (8th ed. 1931). 
· 10. It might be argued that President Nixon had the "inherent" power to impose 
the surcharge by virtue.of art. 2, § 1, of the Constitution, which states that "[t]he 
executive Power shall be vested in a President." See Pres. Proc. No. 4074, 85 Stat. 926 
(1971), stating that the surcharge was imposed by the President "pursuant to the 
authority vested in him by the Constitution • • •• " 
T4is inherent powers theory, first espoused by Alexander Hamilton (see E. CORWIN, 
THE PRESIDENT 177-84 (4th ed. 1957); L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 
42 (1972)), was advanced by Justice Sutherland in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936), to support President Roosevelt's claim of broad discre-
tionary authority in the field of international relations. However, even proponents of 
the theory have recognized that whatever powers are inherent in the phrase "executive 
Power" must still be interpreted "in conformity with other parts of the Constitution." 
E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 10-12 (1917). The Constitu-
tion specifically delegates to Congress the power to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts and Excises" and "to regulate Co~erce with Foreign Nations." U.S. CoNST, 
art. 1, § 8. Therefore, because the surcharge was an additional import duty, its imposi• 
tion cannot be upheld on the basis of the powers inherent in the executive office. See 
United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 659 (4th Cir. 1953), affd., 348 U.S. 296 
(1955), holding that the inherent powers of the President do not include the power to 
regulate interstate and foreign commerce. · 
. 11. 378 F. Supp. D55 (Cust. Ct. 1974). 
12. The President was relying specifically on section 350(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 
19 U.S.C. § 135l(a)(6) (1970). See text at note 53 infra. 
13. 19 u.s.c. §§ 1801-991 (1970). 
14. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1970). 
15. The Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-654 (1970), and the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-991 (1970), were specifically cited by the President in 
Pres. Proc. No. 4074, 85 Stat. 926 (1971), as authority for the imposition of the surcharge. 
See note 1 supra. In arguing its case before the Customs Court, the executive depart• 
ment also relied on the Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1970). See 
Brief for Defendant at 55-67, Yoshida Intl., Inc. v. United States, 3'18 F. Supp. 1155 
(Cust. Ct. 1974) [hereinafter Brief for Defendant]. 
16. The government could be forced to refund as much as $500 million to importers, 
if the President's action was illegal. N.Y. Times, July 9, 1974, at 1, col. 5 (fate city ed.). 
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Section 5(b) of the Trading-with the Enemy Act currently pro-
vides that "[ d]uring the time of war or during any other period of 
national emergency declared by the President," the Chief Executive 
may, "by means of instructions, licenses, or othenvise : . . regulate 
... prevent or prohibit ..• importation ... of ... any property in 
which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest."17 
When the Trading with the Enemy Act was first enacted in 1917 
its scope was restricted to wartime.18 During the domestic :banking 
crisis of 1933 the act was expanded to encompass "any other period of 
national emergency declared by the President."19 It was later held 
that this expansion was not limited to the banking crisis, but autho-' 
rized the President to act in any declared emergency.20 
As originally passed by the House in 1917, the Act did not grant 
the President the power to regulate imports.21 Subsequently, the 
Senate added, and the House approved, section 11, specifically autho-
rizing the P-resident to regulate or prohibit, by proclamation, the 
importation of any article from any country "during the present 
war."22 At the close of World War I this authorization, unlike that 
of section 5(b), terminated, and it has never been reenacted. In 1941, 
an amendment to section 5(b) added, inter alia, "importation" of 
goods to the list of activities that could be regulated "by means of 
instructions, licenses, or otherwise.''23 
Presidential Proclamation 4074 contains a declaration of national 
emergency24 thereby complying with that statutory requirement.25 
And, on its face, the Act does authorize the President to regulate 
imports. However, a closer examination of the Trading with the 
17. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1970). 
18. Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411. 
19. Act of March 9, 1933, ch. 1, tit. I, § 2, 48 Stat. I. The title of the Act read "An 
act to provide relief in the existing national emergency in banking, and for other 
purposes." 
20. See Pike v. United States, 340 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1965) .. 
21. See 55 CONG. REc. 7012 (1917) (remarks of Senator Ransdell). 
22. 50 U.S.C. app. § 11 (1970). The provision states: 
§ 11. Importations prohibited. - . • . 
Whenever during the present war the President shall find that the public safety 
so requires and shall make proclamation thereof it shall be unlawful to import into 
the United States from any country named in such proclamation except at such 
time or times, and under such regulations or orders, and subject to such limitations 
and exceptions as the President shall prescribe, until otherwise ordered by · the 
President or by Congress: Provided, however, That no preference shall be given -
to the ports of one State over those of another. 
23. Act of Dec. 18, 1941, ch. 593, tit. 3, § 301, 55 Stat. 839. The word "instructions" 
was also added by this amendment. 
24. See note I supra. 
25. Courts will not review a declaration of national emergency because such action 
is "so peculiarly within the province of the chief executive • • . • ." Sardina v. Federal 
Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d 106, 109 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966). See also 
Yoshida Intl., Inc. v. United States, 378 F. Supp. 1155, 1170 (Cust. Ct. 1974). 
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· Enemy Act reveals that this statute does not give the executive the 
power to impose a surcharge. 
The fact that Congress, in 1917, severely limited the authoriza-
tion to regulate imports by restricting it to the duration of World 
War I indicates that Congress viewed this as an extraordinary grant 
of power, justified only in extreme circumstances. If, by adding 
"importation" to section 5(b) in 1941, Congress intended to once 
again delegate such sweeping authority to the President without 
limiting its use to wartime, it seems likely that evidence of this in-
tent would appear in the legislative history. In fact, there is no 
history indicating why "importation" was added. Moreover, the 
addition of this word was only a minor change in a much larger 
revisionary scheme, aimed solely at "giv[ing] the President the power 
to actively put into operation those interests or those securities or 
plants that might be taken over and be seized under authority of 
5(b)."26 Thus, there is no evidence that by adding the word "impor-
tation" in the Trading with the Enemy Act, Congress intended to 
delegate to the e)tecutive the expansive power exercised by President 
Nixon in imposing the surcharge. 
In light of the expansion of the Trading with the Enemy Act to 
cover any national emergency, a broad interpretation of the importa-
tion provision would allow the President to subvert the entire tariff 
structure. By merely declaring a state of national emergency the 
President could set tariff rates free from the limitations imposed by 
the Tariff Act of 1930 and the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.27 If the 
declared national emergency involved the kind of extraordinary cir-
cumstances surrounding the 1933 banking crisis, such action by the 
President might be justified. However, in the absence of judicial 
review of a declaration of national emergency,28 there is no way to 
determine if such circumstances are present. Past practices indicate 
that declarations of national emergency are no longer reserved for 
crisis situations. In fact, such a declaration has been in effect in the 
United States since 1950.29 Thus, in order to preserve the integrity 
of the trade acts, it is necessary to interpret narrowly the President's 
power to regulate imports under section 5(b). 
Section 5(b)(I)(A) authorizes the President to regulate "foreign 
exchange, transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to 
any banking institution, and the importing [and] exporting ... of 
26. 87 CONG. REc. 9865 (1941) (remarks of Representative Kefauver). 
27. In his concurring opinion in Yoshida, Judge Maletz recognized that Congress, 
in its debates on the tariff statutes, never indicated that the President already had 
emergency rate-making authority under the Trading with the Enemy Act, 378 F, Supp. 
at 1183. 
28. See note 25 supra. 
29. There has been a declared state of national emergency in the United States 
since President Truman issued Pres, Proc. No. 2914, 64 Stat. A454 (1950). 
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gold or silver coin or bullion, currency or securities •... "30 Because 
the importation of foreign products necessarily involves foreign ex-
change, exportation of currency, and transfers of credit and money 
benveen banking institutions, the President claimed that this provi-
sion supported the imposition of the surcharge. The President com-
pared the surcharge to the Foreign Direct Investment Regulations81 
established by President Johnson in 1968, claiming that both were 
directed at regulating the outflow of dollars from the United States.82 
There is a fundamental difference between the action taken by 
President Johnson ahd that taken by President Nixon. President 
Johnson placed direct controls on the outflow of American currency. 
The surcharge only indirectly affected that outflow. The statute au-
thorizes direct controls. If it is interpreted to allow the President to 
regulate any activity which may ultimately affect international mone-
tary transactions, there would be few internal commercial activities 
which could not be regulated under this provision. 
Finally, it is necessary to consider whether the surcharge was a 
proper mode of regulation under the provisions of the Trading with 
the Enemy Act. The statute currently authorizes the President to act 
only "by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise."33 
The 1917 Act was modeled on a statute enacted during the Civil 
War prohibiting all trade with the insurrectionary states but provid-
ing "[t]hat the Pr-esident may, in his discretion, license and permit 
commercial intercourse ..•. "34 Under the Civil War statute, the 
Supreme Court clearly distinguished the President's power to issue 
licenses from "the power to levy and collect taxes, duties, and ex-
cises.''85 By using this same "licensing" language in the 1917 Act, it is 
reasonable to assume that Congress intended to keep this distinction 
intact.86 There is no legislative history indicating what Congress in-
tended by the inclusion of "instructions" in the provision.87 However, 
80. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(l)(A) (1970). 
81. Exec. Order No. 11887, 8 C.F.R. 192 (1974). 
82. See Brief for Defendant, supra note 15, at 58-61. President Johnson's promulga-
tion of the foreign investment :regulations was motivated by the executive department's 
fear that "[a] continued substantial excess of dollar outflows over dollar inflows could 
undermine the value of the dollar in international commerce." 42 OP. '.ATIY. GEN. 
No. 85, at 9 (1968). President Nixon, in imposing the surcharge, was motivated by a 
similar fear. See Pres. Proc. No. 4074, 85 Stat. 926 (1971);-Brief for Defendant, supra 
note 15, at 60. 
88. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(l) (1970). 
34. Act of July Ill, 1861, ch. 8, § 5, 12 Stat. 257. 
35. Hamilton v. Dillin, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 73, 97 (1875). 
36. See 2A J. SUTHERLAND, SrATUTES AND SrATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 49.09 (4th ed. 
C. Sands 1973): "[W]here the legislature adopts a legislative expression which has 
received judicial interpretation, such interpretation will be prima fade evidence of 
the legislative intent." 
87. "Instructions" was added to section 5(b) in 1941. See note 23 supra. 
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it is likely that "instrµctions" enc,ompasses regulations such as those 
dealing ·with American investments abroad issued by President John-
son.38 
Since Congress specified "instructions" and "licenses" as permis-
sible regulatory devices, the term "othenvise" should only be inter-
preted to encompass similar methods of regulation.89 If Congress had 
intended to give the President unlimited discretion in choosing the 
mode of regulation, it could have done so explicitly.40 Moreover, 
regulating by imposing a surcharge is not "similar" to regulating by 
issuing instructions or licenses. The latter method establishes guide-
lines for engaging in the regulated activity; the former exacts a higher 
fee for, but does not set standards governing, the regulated activity. 
'X'he Tradi_ng ·with the Enemy Act established an exception to the 
common-law principle that all commercial intercourse between war-
ring nations ceases.41 Though the scope of the act was later ex-
panded,42 the statute should not be used as a method of setting tariffs, 
nor as an instrument for fine-tuning the economy. 
The Tariff Act of 1930 as amended, and the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962 were specifically cited in Pr~sidential Proclamation 4074 
as authority for the imposition of the surcharge.43 These two statutes 
in fact provide the legal basis for the President's action. 
Congress first delegated to the President the authority to enter 
into foreign trade agreements in the 1934 amendment44 to the Tariff 
Act of 1930. The delegation of authority contained in this amend-
ment was periodically renewed until 1962, when Congress enacted 
the Trade Expansion Act.45 The major operative provisions of the 
38. See text at notes 31-32 supra. Although regulations promulgated under the 
Trading with the Enemy Act occasionally have been challenged substantively, it has 
always been assumed that these regulations were proper procedurally under the 
language of section 5(b). See, e.g., Pike v. United States, 340 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1965): 
United States v. Quong, 303 F.2d-499 (6th Cir. 1962); United States v. Brovcrman, 180 
F. Supp. 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
39. See 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 36, § 47.17: "Where general words follow 
specific words in an enumeration describing the legal subject, the general words are 
construed to embrace only objects similar in· nature to those objects enumerated by 
the preceding specific ,words." (Footnotes omitted.) 
40. See 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 36, § 47.17: "[H]ad the legislature intended 
the general words to be used in their unrestricted sense, it would have made no 
mention of the particnlar words, but wonld have • used 'only one compendious' 
expression." (Footnotes omitted.) 
41. The purpose of the Trading with the Enemy Act was "to mitigate the rules 
of law which prohibit all intercourse between the citizens of warring nations, and to 
permit, under careful safeguards and restrictions, certain kinds of business to be 
carried on." S. REP. No. 111, 65th Co~g., 1st Sess. 1 (1917). 
42. See text at notes 18-20 supra. 
43. See note 1 supra. 
44. The Trade Agreements Act of 1934, ch. 474, 48.Stat. 943. 
45. Act of Oct. 11, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 {codified at 19 U.S.C. 
§§ 1801-991 (1970)). The negotiating .authority delegated under the Trade Expansion 
Act expired on July 1, 1967. In .1974,. Congress enacted the Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 
9Hl8, 88 Stat. 1978, which again delegates negotiating authority to the executive. 
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1962 Ac,t mirrored those of the: original Tai:iff Act as' amex{ded. Both 
statutes empowered ~e ~resident to negotiate tariff agreements when-
ever he found that "any existjng duties or oth,er import restrictions 
of the United States or any foreign country [were] ,µnduly bu'.i-dening 
and restricting ~e foreign trade of the United States ...• "46 However, 
the President's power was limhed. He could not raise or lower the 
duty by more than a specified percentage of the tariff in existence on 
a particular date chosen_by Congress as a base.47 He also could not 
transfer items benveen the duty list and the free list.48 
The delegation. of negotiating authority to the President under 
these statutes was bifurcated in form.49 Alth_ough the President was 
authorized< to enter into foreign trade agreements; the· agreell}ents 
were not self-executing. In order for µtern to become effective as 
domestic law, the President had to proclaim whatever modifications 
of existing duties or import restrictions were necessary or appropriate 
to carry out the agreements. 50 These proclamations· could· be termi-
nated "in whole or in part"51 without abrogating the underlying 
trade relationships.52 President Nixon claimed that the imposition of 
the surcharge was a valid exercise of his power _to terminate procla-
mations "in part."53 · 
46. Tariff Act of 1930, § 350(a), 19 U,S.C. § 135l(a)(l) (1970). Similar language can 
be found in section 20l(a) of the Trade Expansion Act, 19 U.S.C. § 182l(a) (1970). 
47. Tariff Act of 1930, § S!iO(a)(2), 19 U.S.G. §§ 135l(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4)(A) 
(1970); Trade Expansion Act of .1962, § 20l(b), 19 U.S.C. § 182l(b) (1970). Sections 
IOl(b) and (c) of the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. ~o. 93-618,' 88 Stat. 1978, · contain 
similar restrictions on the President's negotiating authority. . , , 
48. Tariff Act of 1930, § 350(a)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 135l(a)(2)(B) (1970). 130th the Trade 
Expansion Act, § 20l(a)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 182l(a)(2) (1970), and the Trade Act of 1974, 
§ 10l(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, provide that the President may proclaim 
"such continuance of existing duty-free or excise treatment • • • as he determines to 
be required or appropriate to carry out any ••• trade agreement." These acts do not 
give him the authority to carry out agreements by transferring items between the two 
lists. 
49. See Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States 
Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REv. 249, 260 (1967): S. REP. No. 258, 78th Cong.,' 1st Sess. 
48 (1943). . 
50. Tariff Act of 1930, § 350(a)(2), 19 U.S.C. § I35l(a)(l)(B) (1970); Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962, § 20l(a)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 182l{a)(2) (1970). See Jackson, supra note 49, at 
281-85; S. REP. No. 258, supra note 49, at 48. ' ' " ' · 
51. Section 255(b) of the Trade Expansio11, Ac~ 19 U.s.c:, § 1885(b) (1970), p~vides 
that "[t]he President may at any time terminate, in whole or in part, any proclamation" 
made pursuant to his negotiating authority. See Tariff Act of 1930, § 350(a)(2), 19 U.S.C. 
§ 135l(a)(6) (1970). Unlike the power to negotiate trade agreements, see note 45 supra, 
the power to terminate proclamations under the Trade Expansion Act did not expire 
in 1967. ' . 
52. The President ~loes have the power to· terminate trade agreements negotiated 
under the tariff acts. J'rade Agreements Ac~ of 1934, § 2(b), 19 U.S.C. § 1352(b) (1970); 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 255(a), 19 U.S.C. § 18~(a) (1970). ;-There is no percent-
age limitation on the increase<, or decrease in the tariff that resul~ from exercising the 
power to terminate proclamations, see United States v. Metropolitan Petroleum Corp., 
42 C.C.P .A. 38' (1954), similar to the limitation imposed on the President's negotiating 
power. See text at note 47 supra. " · · '' 
53. The Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, specifically authorizes 
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The Customs Court stated that the phrase "terminate, in whole 
or in part" granted the President the power "to nullify and bring to 
an end an entire proclamation" or "to specify the extent to which a 
prior proclamation is terminated, thereby permitting a portion 
thereof to remain in effect."54 Under this interpretation, for example, 
a proclamation could be partially terminated so that it would no 
longer apply to certain items previously covered by it. Thus, if 
Proclamation X had raised the duty on wheat, grain, and soybeans, 
Proclamation Y could terminate Proclamation X to the extent that 
it applied to grain.65 
The court rejected an alternative interpretation of the termina-
tion provision that would have permitted the establishment of inter-
mediate rates of duty by means of a surcharge.66 Under this alternative 
interpretation, for example, if Proclamation Z had lowered the duty 
on com from the statutory twenty per cent rate to a ten per cent rate, 
the President to impose a surcharge to correct a balance of payments deficit. Section 122 
of the new act states, in part: 
(a) Whenever fundamental international payments problems require special 
import measures to restrict imports-
(!) to deal with large and serious United States balance-of-payments deficits, 
(2) to prevent an imminent and significant depreciation of the dollar in 
foreign exchange markets, or 
(3) to cooperate with other countries in correcting an international balance• 
of-payments disequilibrium, 
the President shall proclaim, for a period not exceeding 150 days (unless such 
period is extended by Act of Congress)-
(A) a temporary import surcharge, not to exceed 15 per cent ad valorem, in 
the form of duties (in addition to those already imposed, if any) on articles 
imported into the United States; 
(B) temporary limitations through the use of quotas on the importation of 
articles into the United States; or 
(C) both a temporary import surcharge described in subparagraph (A) and 
temporary limitations described in subparagraph (B). 
One could argue that the enactment of this novel provision indicated that President 
Nixon did not have the authority to impose the surcharge in 1971. However, it is also 
arguable that Congress, responding to the decision in Yoshida, intended only to make 
explicit the powers that the President already possessed under the termination provi-
sion of the Trade Expansion Act. The legislative history of the 1974 Act does not 
resolve this issue. 
54. 378 F. Supp. at 1164-65. 
If President Nixon had "nullified" an entire proclamation or a portion thereof, 
and had taken no further action, the tariff rate for the items affected by the termina• 
tion would have automatically reverted to the "next intervening proclaimed rate," or 
to the statutory rate, if no intervening rate had been proclaimed. United States Tariff 
Schedule, headnote 4(d), 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1970). See discussion in text at notes 80-82 
infra, 
55. The court in Yoshida cited Pres. Proc. No. 3762, 81 Stat. 1076 (1967), issued by 
President Johnson, as exemplifying this interpretation of the power to terminate "in 
part." 378 F. Supp. at 1165. An earlier proclamation, Pres. Proc. No. 3458, 76 Stat. 1457 
(1962), had modified the effective date of previously proclaimed rate increases for many 
items, including sheet glass. President Johnson's proclamation terminated this latter 
J_>roclamation only in so far as it applied to sheet glass. 
56. The imposition of the surcharge had the effect of either establishing the statu-
tory tariff rate or establishing an intermediate tariff rate for all imported items. See 
note I supra. 
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a new fifteen per cent rate could be established by terminating "in 
part" Proclamation Z. The court relied heavily on the legislative 
history of the Trade Expansion Act in rejecting this interpretation 
of the termination provision. However, neither the statutory lan-
guage nor the legislative history of that Act dictates this result. 
The executive version of the Trade Expansion Act, 57 submitted 
to Congress in 1962, contained the following termination provision: 
The President may, at any time terminate in whole or in part, 
any proclamation issued under this title. Termination in part of a 
proclamation reducing a rate of duty may include the proclamation, 
as required or appropriate to carry out any trade agreement under 
this title or any predecessor Act, of a rate of duty higher than such 
reduced rate but not higher than the rate which would have been 
applicable if the proclamation had been terminated in whole.58 
The second sentence of this provision would have explicitly autho-
rized the establishment of intermediate rates of duty as part of the 
President's power to terminate proclamations. This sentence was 
omitted from the bill that was approved by the House Ways and 
Means Committee.69 The Customs Court viewed this omission as 
evidence that Congress did not intend that the President have this 
power.60 However, congressional debates and reports offer no expla-
nation for the omission. It is possible, therefore, that the clause was 
omitted from the final bill because it was considered superfiuous.61 
In an analysis of the bill prepared by . the executive department, 
the second sentence of the termination section was termed a "new 
technical provision" that "would be of use in negotiations."62 This 
language was seen by the court as indicating that even the executive 
department thought that the proposed provision granted the Presi-
dent a new, substantive power.63 However, by describing the delega-
tion of explicit authority to set intermediate rates as a "new technical 
provision," the executive analysis implies that the proposal was not 
a substantive change or addition to the President's power, but a mere 
57. H.R. No. 9900, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). 
58. Hearings on H.R. 9900 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 87th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1962) [hereinafter House Hearings]., 
59. H.R. No. 11970, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) 
60. 378 F. Supp. at 1165-66. 
61. See 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 36, § 48.18, for the proposition that the 
defeat of a proposed amendment to a bill may indicate either that the subject matter 
of the proposal has been rejected; or that it has already been included in the bill 
~in substance." 
62. House Hearings, supra note 58, at 37. The report stated that "[s]uch authority 
would be of use in negotiations under article XXVIII of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade ••• where it is occasionally desirable to agree to make increases in 
rates of duty." Id. 
63. 378 F. Supp. at 1165-66. 
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clarification of powe~s already included in the termination authority.04 
· In an analogous situation, the executive department once inter-
preted a similar termination provision as delegating presidential 
discretion in the tariff area.65 In 1950, the statutory import duty on 
64. It is clear that, under the termination provision, President Nixon had the power 
to abrogate completely the last round of trade agreements by terminating in whole the 
proclamations issued pursuant to those agreements. Thus, by terminating those proc• 
lamations in part and establishing intermediate rates, he was arguably exercising a 
lesser power than his power to terminate in whole, 
The Customs Court rejected this argument, claiming that the presidential discretion 
involved in establishing intermediate rates is a greater exercise of power than merely 
terminating proclamations, where the rate will automatically revert to a prior rate, 
378 F. Supp. at 1164. However, the court failed to distinguish an absolute grant of 
discretion from one that is limited. Clearly, a delegation of authority that allowed the 
President to exercise unbounded discretion would be a greater grant of power than a 
delegation that, when exercised, was governed by automatic rules. But, in this instance, 
the President's exercise of discretion was inherently limited by the statutory rates. 
To illustrate: Assume that, for a single item, there is a set statutory rate of 15 per cent, 
a prior proclaimed rate of 12 per cent, and a presently enforced proclaimed rate of 
10 per cent. According to the court, see text at notes 80-81 infra, the President could 
terminate the 10 per cent rate, and either revive the 12 per cent rate or change the 
order of reversion and reestablish the 15 per cent rate. The President maintained that 
he could terminate the proclamation that lowered the rate by 2 per cent (i.e., from 
12 per cent to 10 per cent) in part, that is, to the extent of 1 per cent. The resulting 
rate would be 11 per cent. Thus, the effect of the President's action would be the im• 
position of a 1 per cent ad valorem surcharge on the item in question. The President 
recognized that under this interpretation he could never impose, for example, a 6 per 
cent surcharge, because the resulting rate would be 16 per cent-a rate higher than 
the statutory maximum. 
The court's concern that the President's interpretation of the termination in part 
proyision would allow the President to exercise greater power than he can exercise 
under the termination in whole provision thus arises from an overly technical inter-
pretation of presidential "discretion." Under either interpretation of the termination 
in :part provision, the President's exercise of discretion is limited by the statutory 
ceiling. 
65. In its brief, Brief for Defendant, supra note 15, at 80-81, the government cited 
another example of a proclamation that terminated in part a prior proclamation, 
resulting in an increase in tariff rates: In 1951, President Truman issued Pres, Proc. 
No. 2929, 65 Stat. CI2 (1951), making the tariff rates agreed upon in the Torquay 
Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), April 21, 1951, 
3 ·U.S.T. 588, T.I.A.S. No. 2420, 142 U.N.T.S. 34, effective as domestic law. Part three 
of this proclamation terminated in part the proclamation (Pres. Proc. No. 2761A, 
61 Stat. 1103 (1947)) that had made effective the original GATT rates to the extent 
that it subjected certain items to the new rates established under the Torquay Protocol. 
These new rates were higher than the previous GATT rates, but lower than the 
statutory rates. The Customs Court, relying on United States v. Aris Gloves, Inc,, 
48 C.C.P .A. 126 (1961), found that President Truman's proclamation merely instituted 
a new trade agreement, and did not independently terminate in part a prior procla• 
mation. 378 F. Supp. at 1167. 
In Aris, an importer affected by the rates set forth in the Torquay Protocol chal• 
lenged the validity of that protocol as a "trade agreement," claiming that the govern• 
ment had neglected to give notice of intent to negotiate as required under the tariff 
acts. The court _held that the Torquay Protocol was effective as a new trade agreement, 
since it found that in fact notice had been given. 48 C.C.P .A, at 129. This holding, 
however, do.es not answer the question whether the rate increase proclaimed by 
President Truman would have been effective as a termination of the GATT procla• 
mation, if the Torquay Protocol had not been found to be an independent trade 
agreement. 
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Irish potatoes was seventy-five cents per one hundred pounds.66 Under 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 67 some potatoes we~e 
dutiable at thirty-seven and a half cents.68 President Truman, exercis-
ing his power to terminate proclamations in part, 69 reduced the 
number of potatoes that could be imported at the lower rate,70 thus 
subjecting more potatoes to the higher statutory duty. 
Exposing more potatoes to the higher rate of duty raised the 
average rate that was imposed on imported potatoes.71 By successively 
lowering the quota, the President could expose more and more pota-
toes to the higher rate, and thus increase the average rate. Ultimately, 
he could reduce the quota to zero, exposing all imported potatoes to 
the higher statutory rate. 
The plenary power to change the quota parallels the power to 
establish intermediate rates of duty. The former power modifies the 
average rate, 72 while the latter alters the actual rate imposed. Both 
powers involve the exercise of broad discretion that impacts directly 
on tariff rates, and the exercise of both powers is limited by the 
statutory rates. 
66. 19 U.S.C. § 1001, para. 771 (1940). The statutory rate for Irish potatoes has 
remained the same. 19 U.S.C. § 1202, item 137.20 (1970). 
67. GATT, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, at A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1947). GATT has been exten-
sively amended and modified. For a list of "official" GATT agreements through Oct. 
15, 1967, see Jackson, supra note 49, at 319-31. 
68. GATT, Schedule 20, pt. 1, item 771,-61 Stat. All57 (1947). 
69. See Pres. Proc. No. 2901, 64 Stat. A427, A429-30 (1950). Paragraph 4 of this 
proclamation stated: "WHEREAS, on April 3, 1950, by a decision of the oontracting 
parties to the said General Agreement, acting jointly ••• the obligations of the United 
States ••• were waived •••• " 64 Stat. at A428. Relying on this language, the importer 
in Yoshida claimed that the change in the import quota had been accomplished by 
President Truman by means of a GATT waiver, rather than by terminating a prior 
proclamation in part. See Reply Brief for Plaintiff at 26, Yoshida Intl., Inc. v. United 
States, 378 F. Supp. 1155 (Cust. Ct. 1974) [hereinafter Reply Brief]. Arguing that the 
GATT waiver was in essence a new trade agreement, the importer oontended that 
President Truman had properly exercised his authority to enter into trade agreements 
and proclaim such modifications necessary to make the agreements effective domestically. 
Reply Brief, supra, at 26-28. See text at notes 49-50 supra. 
Contrary to the importer's contention, however, a GATT waiver is not a new trade 
agreement. If President Truman had failed to obtain a GATT waiver, his proclamation 
reducing the quota for potatoes still would have been effective as domestic law. The 
waiver merely prevented the United States from violating its international obligations. 
See J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 734-35 (1969). 
70. Pres. Proc. No. 2901, 64 Stat. A427 (1950). 
71. In its brief in Yoshida, the executive c,lepartment claimed that "by decreasing 
the quantity of potatoes that would have been eligible for the quota rate • • • the 
President proclaimed a rate which was less favorable than the GATT rate but more 
favorable than the statutory rate." Brief for Defendant, supra note 15, at 30. This 
interpretation of President Truman's action is clearly wrong, since the proclamation 
affected the average rate, not the actual rate, for potatoes. 
The average rate of duty will never be imposed on any imported goods. Until the 
quota is reached, goods will be taxed at the lower rate; goods imported after the quota 
has been reached will be taxed at the higher rate. It is the average of these tivo rates 
that will be affected by changing the quota.· 
72. See note 71 supra. 
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In 1962, Congress was aware of President Truman's use of the 
termination power,73 yet it made no attempt to restrict the scope of 
this power in the Trade Expansion Act.74 Because the power exer-
cised by President Truman is so similar to that exercised by President 
Nixon, there is little reason to assume that Congress intended to 
permit the former while forbidding the latter. Thus, it is reasonable 
to conclude that the explicit grant of authority in the proposed 
termination provision was omitted because Congress believed that 
this authority was inherent in the phrase "terminate, in whole or in 
part." 
In 1962, the Senate adopted a provision which would have granted 
the President sweeping authority to impose import restrictions.711 
This provision, which would have explicitly permitted the President 
to impose a surcharge, was removed from the final Trade Expansion 
Act by the House-Senate conference committee. 76 The court relied 
on the rejectiol). of this provision as additional evidence that Congress 
did not intend to delegate this power to the President. 
The provision would have authorized the President, whenever 
he determined it to be in the national interest, to impose any rate 
of duty that he thought was necessary, even a rate above the statutory 
limit. He also would have had the authority under this provision to 
impose tariffs on duty-free articles. Thus, the section rejected by the 
conference committee gave the President "unlimited and undefined" 
power77 over tariffs. In the congressional debate on this provision, 
Senator Byrd noted that this section contained no specific guidelines 
for the use of the power and did not provide adequate congressional 
review of presidential actions.78 
The fact that Congress was unwilling to give the President the 
authority to impose any duty on any article, regardless of whether 
the item had previously been subject to a tariff, does not indicate 
that Congress intended to deny the President limited discretion to 
set intermediate rates pursuant to his termination power.70 There-
fore, the rejection of the Senate provision should not be used as a 
basis for declaring the surcharge illegal. 
73. See H.R. REP. No. 2007, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 129-30 (1955). 
74. Compare Tariff Act of 1930, § 350(a)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 135l(a)(6) (1970), with Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962, § 255(b), 19 U.S.C. § 1885(b) (1970). 
75. This provision would have amended section 353 of H.R. No. 11970, 87th Cong,, 
2d Sess. (1962). See 108 CONG. REc, 19874-75 (remarks of Senators Jackson, Holland and 
Williams). 
76. H.R. REP. No. 2518, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1962), 
77. 108 CONG. REc. 22182 (1962) (remarks of Senator Byrd). 
78. Id. 
79. In imposing the surcharge, President Nixon specifically acknowledged that his 
authority to do so was limited by the statutory rates. Pres. Proc. No. 4074, 85 Stat. 926 
(1971). See note I supra. 
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Headnote 4( d) of the tariff schedules provides further evidence 
of the meaning of the termination power: "[W]henever a proclaimed 
rate is terminated or suspended, the rate shall revert, unless otherwise 
provided, to the next intervening proclaimed rate previously super-
seded but not terminated or, if none, to the statutory rate."80 The 
Customs Court, citing no authority to substantiate its position, held 
that the phrase "unless otherwise provided" meant only that the 
President could change the order of reversion. 81 Thus, if the President 
had proclaimed a rate of fifteen per cent and then successively lowered 
it to twelve per cent and ten per cent, under this interpretation he 
could terminate the proclamation establishing the ten per cent rate 
and revive the fifteen per cent rate, bypassing the twelve per cent 
tariff. The most natural reading of the language of this headnote, 
however, indicates that Congress expected the rate to revert only 
when the President did not "otherwise provide."82 Under this read-
ing, imposing a surcharge would be an alternative to the automatic 
reversion outlined in the headnote. It is certainly arguable that Con-
gress, by including the phrase "unless otherwise provided,". intended 
that the President have such power. 
A major reason for the court's narrow interpretation of the termi-
nation provision in Yoshida, was the court's belief that Congress did 
not intend to grant the President broad discretion to set tariffs uni-
laterally. 83 Powers granted to the President under the escape clause 
of the Trade Expansion Act84 indicate that this belief was unfounded. 
80. 19 u.s.c. § 1202 (1970). 
81. 378 F. Supp. at 1164. The court in Yoshida arguably could have found support 
for its position here in dictum appearing in United States v. American Bitumuls & 
Asphalt Co., 246 F.2d 270 (C.C.P.A. 1957). In explaining the difference between the 
negotiating provision of the Tariff Act of 1930, which expressly limited the President's 
power to raise tariffs, see text at notes 46-48 supra, and the termination provision of 
that Act, which contained no such restrictions, see note 52 supra, the court in American 
Bitumuls stated: "There is a logical reason for placing a limitation on the tariff changes 
which may be effected by proclamations giving effect or carrying-out trade agreements 
but not those which merely terminate other proclamations, since the latter can do no 
more than restore rates which have already been legally established, and are thus 
inherently limited." 246 F.2d at 275 (emphasis original). While the statement that the 
President, using his power to terminate proclamations, "can do no more than" re-
establish prior legal rates would seem to support a restrictive reading of headnote 4, 
this language can also be interpreted to mean that, although the President can exer-
cise discretion in establishing intermediate rates under the termination provision, he 
may not impose a duty that is higher than prior statutory rates. 
82. The court in Yoshida interpreted the headnote as though it read, "[W]henever 
a proclaimed rate is terminated or suspended, the rate shall revert to the next interven-
ing proclaimed rate, unless othenvise provided •••• " In fact, the phrase "unless other-
wise provided" modifies only "revert." 
83. 378 F. Supp. at 1164-66. 
84. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 35l(a)(l), 19 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). For a discussion 
of the use of the escape clause provision in trade negotiations, see S. METzGER, TRADE 
AGREEMENTS AND THE KENNEDY ROUND 43-54 (1964); Enger, U.S. Tariff Adj~tment and 
Adjustment Assistance, 6 J. WoRLD TRADE L. 518 (1972). 
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The escape clause provides that if a domestic industry believes 
that it has been, or ·will be, injured by the increased importation of 
foreign products due to tariff concessions in trade agreements, it can 
petition the Tariff Commission85 to conduct an investigation. If the 
Commission's study verifies the complaints of the industry, the Com-
mission recommends to the President that he impose import restric-
tions to remedy the injury.86 Prior to 1962, the President, upon 
receipt of the Commission's report, was empowered only to reject 
the recommendation or to "make such adjustments in the rates of 
duty, impose such quotas, or make such other modifications as are 
found and reported by the Commission."81 He could not amend the 
recommendation or impose a different remedy.88 
In 1962, the provision governing the President's authority in 
escape clause proceedings was amended, allowing the President to 
"proclaim such increase in, or importation of, any duty or other 
import restriction ... as he determines to be necessary to prevent 
or remedy serious injury."80 This clearly is an expansion of the 
President's discretionary authority,90 as he is no longer bound by the 
Commission's report. Although the exercise of the escape clause 
power is distinguishable from the exercise of the termination power,01 
qoth grant the President authority to restrict imports, and the 1962 
amendment indicates that Congress has been willing to grant the 
President discretion in setting tariffs. 02 
The delegation to the President of broad powers in the tariff 
area has been necessitated, in part, because Congress is too large and 
unwieldy to conduct tariff policy effectively.03 Congress is often not 
85. For a general discussion of the role of the Tariff Commission in setting tariff 
rates, see F. TAUSSIG, supra note 9, at 405-06, 481-87; Bronz, The Tariff Commission as 
a Regulatory Agency, 61 CoLUM. L. REv. 463 (1961). 
86. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 1901 (1970). 
87. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, § 7(c), 65 Stat. 74 (emphasis added). 
88. See United States v. Schmidt Pritchard & Co., 47 C.C.P.A. 152, cert. denied, 
364 U.S. 919 (1960). 
89. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 351(a)(l), Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970)) (emphasis added). 
90. Sec 108 CONG. REc. 12048 (1962) (remarks of Representative Moore); Comment, 
"In Major Part"-The New Causation Problem in the Trade-Agreements Program, 
44 TEXAS L. REv. 1331, 1335 (1966). 
91. Escape clause actions are designed only to prevent or remedy injuries to domestic 
industries and are initiated only after the Tariff Commission has submitted a report 
to the President. See text at notes 85-89 supra. The termination power may be exercised 
on the President's own initiative, and its purpose is not restricted to the protection of 
domestic industry. See text at notes 49-52 supra. 
92. It might be argued that, if Congress had intended to grant broad, discretionary 
powers to the President under the termination provision, it would have done so as 
explicitly as it did in the amendment to the escape clause. However, it is again possible 
~o conclude that Congress, in 1962, believed that the language of the termination pro-
vision already gave the President broad, discretionary powers so that it was unnecessary 
to be more specific. Cf. note 61 · supra and accompanying text. 
93. See K. MACKENZIE, supra note 9, at 2-3. 
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able to respond quickly; the process by which a bill is enacted into 
law sometimes stretches over several years. By delegating authority 
over tariff matters to the President, "prompt and decisive" action can 
be taken when circumstances demand it.94 -
The vulnerability of Congress to the pressures of special interest 
groups is also a problem in the tariff area. Legislators often seek 
tariffs that will protect regional industry at the expense of national 
interests. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act is an example of this.95 That 
Act raised tariffs to "unprecedented heights," strangling world trade 
and contributing to the economic crisis of the 1930's.96 Because the 
President is not subject to regional pressures, Congress, in 1934, gave 
him the power to negotiate tariff agreements under the Trade Agree-
ments Act. 97 
Th~re is also a great need for efficient, effective, unitary action 
when tariff questions, balance of payments considerations, and prob-
lems of international monetary policy combine to produce interna-
tional crises. Historically, Congress has been aware of this- problem. 
Congressman Smith, speaking in support of the 1934 Trade Agree-
ments Act, expressed the concern of many legislators that the mis-
alignment of exchange rates was negating the United States tariff 
structure and damaging American industry, labor and agriculture.98 
In debating the 1962 trade bill, Senators Jackson and Holland out-
lined the interrelated problems confronting the United States.99 
These included tariffs, quotas, unfair trade practices and "differences 
in exchange, which have proved to be quite a hurdle with respect to 
the rebuilding by our vegetable and fruit industries of the markets 
which they had before World War II .... "100 
The Senators believed that the President would be able to allevi-
ate these problems by using the powers delegated to him in the Trade 
Expansion Act. Senator Jackson issued a directive to the President 
to "look at the problem in broad perspective, not merely from the 
standpoint of tariffs, but also with respect to all the other devices 
94. Cf. remarks of Representative Smith, 78 CONG, REc. 5286 (1934), lauding 
President Roosevelt for his "prompt and decisive" action in taking the United States 
off the gold standard. 
95. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-654 (1970). One commentator described the 
passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act as follows: "The majority members of the 
House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee initially wrote 
the tariff bill to suit their own local and regional interests. A floor fight in the House 
was quelled by the log-rolling expedient of providing something for almost everyone •••• 
In the Senate the relaxed rules of debate facilitated obstruction which pressured the 
distribution of more bounty." K. MACKENZIE, supra note 9, at 2-3. Mackenzie concludes 
that the passage of this act "completely submerged the national interest" and "dis· 
credited Congressional drafting of tariff legislation." Id. at 3. 
96. J. MACKENZIE, supra note 9, at 3. 
97. Pub. L. No. 316, 48 Stat. 943 (1934). See J. MACKENZIE, supra note 9, at 3. 
98. 78 CONG, REc, 5286 (1934) (remarks of Representative Smith). 
99. 108 CONG. REc. 19874 (1962) (remarks of Senators Jackson and Holland). 
100. Id. 
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used to make it more difficult for our commerce, agriculture and 
industry to properly compete in world markets."101 Thus, a narrow 
interpretation of the powers delegated to the executive under the 
Trade Expansion Act would frustrate congressional intent by deny-
ing the executive the authority to respond adequately to problems 
created by the interrelationship of tariff policies and "differences in 
exchange." Only if the Trade Expansion Act is interpreted to permit 
such action as the imposition of a surcharge, can the President ade-
quately deal with the multitude of problems that prompted Congress 
to enact that statute.102 
In Yoshida, the Customs Court relied on the legislative history 
of the Trading with the Enemy Act and the Trade Expansion Act 
of 1962 to conclude that President Nixon's action in imposing the 
ten per cent ad valorem surcharge was illegal. Although the history 
of the Trading with the Enemy Act supports a finding that the 
President's action was not authorized under that statute, a careful 
examination of the history of the Trade Expansion Act103 reveals 
101. Id. 
Other government officials have also tied the passage of trade legislation to our 
balance of payments position. In submitting the executive version of the Trade Expan• 
sion Act to Congress in 1962, President Kennedy stated in part: 
The growing pressures on our balance-of-payments position have, in the past 
few years, turned a new spotlight on the importance of increasing American 
exports to strengthen the international position of the dollar •••• 
Our efforts to correct our adverse balance of payments have in recent years 
roughly paralleled our ability to increase our export surplus •••• If that surplus 
can be enlarged, as exports under our new program rise faster than imports, we 
can achieve the equilibrium in our balance of payments which is essential to our 
economic stability •••• 
House Hearings, supra note 58, at 2-3. See also id. at 63-72, 95 (remarks of Luther H. 
Hodges, Secretary of Commerce), 815-33 (remarks of C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of 
the Treasury). 
102. The need for "adequate authority" to deal with the multitude of interrelated 
problems that affect tariff decisions was stressed again in hearings on the proposed 
Trade Reform Act of 1973. Ambassador William Eberle, Special United States Repre• 
sentative for Trade Negotiations, stated: "Recurrent crises in international monetary 
affairs in recent years, and the massive deterioration in the United States external posi• 
tion testify to the need for a more effective and efficient adjustment process •••• A 
comprehensive approach is required • • • • Adequate authority to take appropriate 
action in the trade field is an important element in any program to assure balance-of. 
payments equilibrium." Hearings on H.R. 6767 Before the House Comm. on Ways and 
Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 365 (1973). The proposed act was enacted as the Trade Act 
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978. 
103. Of course, there is always a danger in relying too heavily on legislative history 
to support a particular interpretation of statutory language. One Supreme Court Justice 
has stated that the use of legislative history in statutory construction is "not interpreta-
tion of a statute but creation of a statute." United States v. Public Util. Commn,, 345 
U.S. 295, 319 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
Even in cases where legislative history is potentially useful, the danger of its mis• 
application is great. See 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 36, § 48.02: 
[T]he conclusions imparted by historical data will differ according to whether they 
are examined in detail as so many identifiable facts or in composite to discover the 
overall impression which they create. The first approach conduces to an arbitrary, 
quantitative method of evaluation by which the conclusion wins which is supported 
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that this statute may indeed provide the legal basis for the imposition 
of the surcharge. 
The nature of international trade dictates that the President have 
comprehensive, flexible authority to set tariff rates. Foreign powers 
need assurance that tariff agreements reached after prolonged nego-
tiations with the President will not be frustrated by a recalcitrant 
Congress.104 Moreover, presidential discretion would allow American 
negotiators to bargain more effectively for tariff concessions.105 With-
out this discretion, foreign countries may be less willing to negotiate 
major tariff reductions, knowing that if the agreements are later 
terminated because the reductions were too large, the tariffs will 
automatically revert to the previously established higher rates.106 
Thus, a result upholding the President's authority to set intermediate 
rates under the termination provision of the Trade Expansion Act is 
legally sound, and would be more responsive to the realities of a 
world economy.107 
by the greatest number of facts. The latter produces qualitative judgments en-
lightened by a sense of history. 
(Emphasis original; footnote deleted.) The Customs Court failed to appreciate the 
"overall impression" of the legislative history, and consequently adopted an overly 
narrow interpretation of the Pre_sident's power under the Trade Expansion Act. 
104. Such assurances are necessary in view of the fact that foreign executives gen-
erally have more power over internal trade matters than does the President, and 
therefore can be less restrained in their negotiations with the United States. See, e.g., 
K. MACKENZIE, supra note 9, at 55-71, for a discussion of the Canadian executive's 
authority in trade matters. 
105. See K. MACKENZIE, supra note 9, at xvi; 108 CoNG. R.Ec. 12000 (1962) (remarks 
of Representative Curtis). 
106. See K. MACKENZIE, supra note 9, at 45: "[A] wholesale termination of agreements 
would result in a return to the rates in the Hawley-Smoot tariff, which remain the 
statutory rates of duty and are modified only by trade agreements in force • • • • [T]he 
United States liberal trade policy of the last thirty years is wholly dependent upon the 
trade agreement structure." 
107. Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, ensures 
that the President's authority to impose an import surcharge will no longer be chal-
lenged. See note 53 supra. But the ultimate adjudication of Yoshida is still critical, not 
only because there are large sums of money involved, see note 16 supra, but also because 
of the potential impact of this case on the interpretation of future legislation involving 
presidential discretion in international trade. 
